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We examine the association between economic climate and auditor risk acceptance as measured by the auditors' reaction 
to internal control weaknesses. We hypothesize and find that auditors address risk in a way that is conditioned on the 
economic environment. In particular, we find that during periods of weak economic activity, auditors tend to assess 
lower risk premiums and are less likely to resign in response to an adverse ICFR opinion. However, we find evidence 
that economic factors do not influence fees assessed by incoming auditors following a resignation in the presence of an 
ICFR weakness. Our results indicate that auditors modify their engagement risk strategies during challenging economic 
times and accept higher levels of risk to attract and retain clients. For the riskiest clients, however, economic factors do 
not appear to influence auditors' risk pricing.
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We examine the association between economic climate and auditor risk acceptance as measured by the auditors' 
reaction to internal control weaknesses. We hypothesize and find that auditors address risk in a way that is 
conditioned on the economic environment. In particular, we find that during periods of weak economic activity, 
auditors tend to assess lower risk premiums and are less likely to resign in response to an adverse ICFR opinion. 
However, we find evidence that economic factors do not influence fees assessed by incoming auditors following a 
resignation in the presence of an ICFR weakness. Our results indicate that auditors modify their engagement risk 
strategies during challenging economic times and accept higher levels of risk to attract and retain clients. For the 
riskiest clients, however, economic factors do not appear to influence auditors' risk pricing. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Subsequent to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act (U.S. 
House of Representatives, 2002) and the continuing developments 
guided by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
the issue of engagement risk continues to be a major concern for the 
audit profession. Audit partners must give careful consideration to the 
selection and retention of clients while maintaining a balance with 
regard to the audit risks each client represents. Pre-SOX studies show 
that auditors react to engagement risk, as auditor resignations are 
more likely to occur when companies indicate signs of being high-risk 
clients (e.g., Bockus & Gigler, 1998; Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997; Shu, 
2000). Post-SOX studies reiterate that auditors are less likely to continue 
with high-risk clients (e.g., Elder, Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2009; Landsman, 
Nelson, & Rountree, 2009). Resignations, however, result in a loss of rev- 
enues to the firm. Audit firms are for-profit enterprises and must also 
make client engagement and continuance decisions based on their 
need for income and the economic environment in which they compete. 
Weak economic conditions have placed financial pressures on audit 
firms, forcing them to consider cost-cutting options such as lay-offs 
and spending cuts (Ramos, 2009). The increased financial pressure 
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may also cause audit firms to alter how they manage their client- 
based revenue stream; for example, they may be less likely to resign 
from engagements when there is a high need for the income generated 
by the engagement. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether 
poor economic conditions change auditors' risk management policies, 
particularly the auditors' willingness to retain and properly price risky 
clients. 
We examine the association between auditor resignations and the 
presence of a material weakness in internal control, as indicated by an 
adverse opinion on internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), 
and what impact the recent economic recession has had on such resig- 
nations in an effort to gain insight into how economic conditions impact 
a firm's risk management. An increase in auditor resignations following 
an adverse ICFR opinion is consistent with an auditor reacting to a per- 
ceived increase in engagement risk associated with the opinion 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & Kinney, 2007). However, difficult economic 
times may alter the profit-risk tradeoff, making a marginal increase in 
risk preferable to a resignation. An alternative reaction to the perceived 
increase in risk associated with an adverse ICFR opinion is to charge 
clients a risk premium (Canada, Sutton, & Kuhn, 2009; Hogan & Wil- 
kins, 2008; Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 2008; Pratt & Stice, 1994; 
Raghunandan & Rama, 2006). In a difficult economic climate, however, 
the fear of losing a client may result in an auditor's unwillingness or 
inability to fully price the risk associated with that particular client. 
Accordingly, we further investigate auditor fees following an adverse 
ICFR opinion. We also provide insight into whether economic factors 
influence subsequent auditors risk pricing for what we assume are the 
riskiest clients, those with an adverse ICFR opinion whose auditors 
have resigned. 
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We use a sample of ICFR filers from November 15, 2004, through 
January 5, 2012, to investigate the association between adverse ICFR 
opinions and auditor resignations and fees in varying economic envi- 
ronments. We use the Leading Index for the United States provided by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia to measure the economic envi- 
ronment. We find evidence that audit firms are willing to accept more 
risk when the economy is poor. In particular, audit firms are more likely 
to continue with risky clients than they would be in more prosperous 
times. Although they continue to charge a risk premium to high-risk 
clients, as represented by those with an adverse ICFR opinion, the risk 
premium is significantly lower when the economy is weak. Given that 
prior literature shows a link between increased auditor fees and likeli- 
hood of auditor dismissal (Ettredge, Li, & Scholz, 2007), the observed 
decrease in risk premiums may represent an effort by firms to lower 
the likelihood of their dismissal. However, for those clients considered 
the most risky (i.e., auditor resignations following adverse ICFR opinions 
during a recession), the economic state does not appear to impact the 
risk premium successor auditors charge. Thus, audit firms appear to 
alter their risk management policies and accept more risk when the 
economy is weak. However, when considering risk pricing for the risk- 
iest of clients, the economic environment is not a factor. 
Our paper extends both the accounting risk management litera- 
ture and the literature that examines the influence of economic fac- 
tors on the audit. Prior risk management literature has examined 
how audit firms use resignations and fees to manage engagement risk 
(e.g., Bockus & Gigler, 1998; Johnstone & Bedard, 2004; Krishnan & 
Krishnan, 1997; Lee, Mande, & Ortman, 2004; Munsif, Raghunandan, 
Rama, & Singhvi, 2011; Pratt & Stice, 1994; Shu, 2000). We extend the 
literature by examining how the use of these risk management tools 
is altered by the economic climate. Our paper also contributes to the 
limited research examining the impact of economic factors on the 
audit. Prior literature investigates changes in audit fees and audit qual- 
ity during various economic climates (e.g., Ettredge, Fuerherm, & Li, 
2014; Krishnan & Zhang, 2014; Leone, Rice, Weber, & Willenborg, 
2013). Most similar to our study, Schroeder and Hogan (2013) examine 
changes in client portfolios across varying economic climates and regu- 
latory changes (i.e., Audit Standard 2 versus Audit Standard 5). While 
Schroeder and Hogan (2013) examine changes in financial, audit, and 
auditor risk of client portfolios as a whole, we extend their research 
by focusing on a subset of risky clients, those with adverse ICFR opin- 
ions, and how audit firms manage risk related to those particular clients 
over the various economic climates. 
Our paper provides important insights to both practitioners and 
policy makers regarding risk management practices. Quality control 
standards at both the PCAOB and American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) require firms to have policies and procedures in 
place to re-evaluate whether to continue client relationships each 
year, including examining various risk factors associated with client 
continuance (AICPA, 2011; PCAOB, 2003). Our results indicate that the 
economic environment impacts fee premium and retention decisions 
related to risky clients. Thus, our results demonstrate that practitioners 
are flexible with risk thresholds, indicating that firms' policies and pro- 
cedures on quality control allow for variability in fee and retention deci- 
sions. Regulators and practitioners alike should keep in mind this need 
for flexibility when creating new policies and regulations in this area. 
Further, we provide insight into mechanisms other than cost-cutting 
that auditors use to manage their budget in difficult times. In particular, 
we provide evidence that auditors change how they manage their client 
base and risk profile, possibly in an effort to retain revenues. 
Lastly, coupled with the findings of Ettredge et al. (2014), our find- 
ings provide insight regarding audit quality for high risk clients during 
difficult economic times. Ettredge et al. (2014) find that fee pressure 
during the economic downturn is associated with reduced audit quality. 
While we do not investigate the origins of the observed reduced fee 
premiums assessed to high risk clients during poor economic times 
(i.e., client pressure or auditor motivated), a reduction in fees as a result 
of client pressure may be associated with reduced audit quality for risk- 
ier clients, the exact clients in which higher quality audits are critical. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 
discusses the background literature and develops the hypothe- 
ses. Section 3 describes the methodology and sample selection proce- 
dures used to investigate our research question. Results are presented 
in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses 
 
Auditor departures, whether initiated by the client or the auditor, 
occur for a variety of reasons. Extant research has shown client char- 
acteristics, such as size, leverage, management changes, and audit 
committee composition can result in an auditor change (Carcello & 
Neal, 2003; DeFond, 1992; Ettredge et al., 2007; Johnson & Lys, 1990; 
Krishnan, 1994). Audit firm departures can also be motivated by dis- 
agreements over audit fees or a mismatch between services requested 
and those able to be performed by audit firms (Ettredge et al., 2007; 
Turner, Williams, & Weirich, 2005). Still other factors, such as the pres- 
ence of internal control deficiencies (ICD), are associated with auditor 
changes (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Elder et al., 2009; Ettredge 
et al., 2007; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2007; Thevenot & Hall, 2011). 
 
2.1. Internal controls and auditor changes 
 
Several recent research studies reveal a link between ICDs and audi- 
tor changes. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) directly test whether 
auditor changes are higher for firms that report ICDs versus those that 
do not report deficiencies. Findings support their hypotheses that 
firms reporting ICDs have more auditor changes than those without 
deficiencies. Thevenot and Hall (2011) find that entity level ICDs in par- 
ticular, which are arguably more severe than account specific deficien- 
cies, impact auditor changes. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) examine 
auditor changes further and find that both auditor resignations and 
auditor dismissals are associated with higher frequencies of ICDs. 
Ettredge, Heintz, Li, and Scholz (2011) further Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2007) and find that firms receiving an adverse ICFR opinion are posi- 
tively associated with auditor dismissals in particular. Auditor dis- 
missals following the disclosure of ICDs and/or adverse ICFR opinions 
may occur for many reasons: to find a more compliant auditor, to punish 
the auditor for non-performance when the ICD is found by management 
versus the auditor, or, relatedly, to signal users of management efforts to 
improve overall financial reporting quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2007; Ettredge et al., 2011). In contrast to Ettredge et al. (2011), Elder 
et al. (2009) examine the relationship between auditor resignations 
and ICDs. Using data from the year immediately following SOX imple- 
mentation, they find that auditor resignations are more likely for firms 
with ICDs than for those without. Elder et al. (2009) conclude that the 
resignations are an effort made by the auditor to control litigation risk. 
 
 
2.2. Auditor resignations and litigation risk 
 
Auditor resignations motivated by an increase in litigation risk is a 
common finding among academic research (Bockus & Gigler, 1998; 
Johnstone & Bedard, 2004; Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997; Lee et al., 
2004; Shu, 2000). Auditor resignations are more likely to occur when 
a company has high financial distress, high variability in stock returns, 
low auditor independence, and the receipt of a modified opinion, partic- 
ularly a going concern opinion (Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997; Lee et al., 
2004). Auditor resignations are also more likely following a restate- 
ment, especially one that is attributable to fraud or reverses a previously 
reported income, when there is a client disagreement, or when there are 
reportable events within the company (Huang & Scholz, 2012; Krishnan 
& Krishnan, 1997). All of these factors most likely increase the litigation 
risk for the auditor. 
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Companies reporting ICDs often have many of the same characteris- 
tics that are associated with an increase in litigation risk for the auditor. 
Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007) find firms disclosing material weaknesses 
are smaller, younger, financially weaker, more complex, growing rapid- 
ly, or are undergoing restructuring. Similarly, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2007) find companies with ICDs have more complex operations, recent 
organizational changes, and more accounting risk than firms that do not 
have ICDs. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) also note there are more audi- 
tor resignations for companies reporting ICDs than those not reporting 
ICDs. Similarly, other research finds that firms are more likely to dismiss 
clients when their internal control effectiveness is weak and that, as the 
number of weaknesses increase, the likelihood that the auditor will 
resign also increases (Johnstone & Bedard, 2004; Thevenot & Hall, 
2011). These findings are consistent with Elder et al.'s (2009) conclu- 
sion that auditors resign from clients reporting ICDs in an attempt to 
manage litigation risk. 
 
2.3. Impact of economy on auditor resignations 
 
In the immediate years following the Enron debacle and the implo- 
sion of Arthur Anderson, audit firms became more selective regarding 
their client base and began to resign from riskier clients (Hindo, 2003; 
Landsman et al., 2009). These resignations from risky clients were not, 
however, due entirely to audit firms becoming more risk averse. At 
that time, audit firms were faced with substantially more work. The 
demise of Arthur Anderson meant that many large companies were in 
the market for a new auditor. Furthermore, the requirement that public 
companies obtain an internal control audit, outlined in Section 404 of 
SOX, substantially increased the workload of larger auditing firms 
(Landsman et al., 2009). This prospect of new clients, coupled with 
the increased workload associated with public clients, allowed audit 
firms the opportunity to resign from riskier clients without an unneces- 
sary financial burden.4 
Unfortunately, poor economic conditions may not afford accounting  
firms the opportunity to resign from riskier clients as frequently as they 
might during more prosperous times. Accounting firms have lost audit 
clients due to bankruptcy, and some clients have chosen to forego an 
annual audit. Further, firms have lost consulting engagements due to 
clients' own cost-cutting strategies. Accounting firms themselves have 
been forced to consider cost-cutting options such as lay-offs and spend- 
ing cuts (Ramos, 2009). Therefore, we may see that auditor resignations 
of clients with increased risk factors, such as those receiving an adverse 
opinion on ICFR, decreases during an economic downturn. 
In contrast, an economic downturn likely impacts the operations and 
financial reporting of many audit firms' clients in a negative way. Such 
impacts can significantly increase previously identified audit risks or 
cause new risks to arise (PCAOB, 2008). The concern over increased 
audit risk during the most recent economic downturn was large enough 
to warrant attention from standard setters at both the PCAOB and the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), as 
both organizations issued special practice alerts related to the increase 
in risk (IAASB, 2009; PCAOB, 2008). This response to the increase in 
risk by standard setters, coupled with the increase in overall risk factors 
among clients, suggests we may observe an increase in resignations of 
riskier clients during an economic downturn. Despite this possibility, 
retaining clients during difficult economic times is necessary for a firm's 
long-term viability. We assert that long-term viability concerns during a 
weak economy will cause firms to retain clients that would otherwise 
be dropped, with the expectation that internal control weaknesses can 
be remedied. As all audit firms seek to retain a client base during 
 
 
4 As Landsman et al. (2009) point out, an alternative explanation for the observed 
changes in auditor change behavior immediately following the demise of Arthur Anderson 
and the implementation of SOX could be due to the availability of former Anderson clients 
that were better aligned with the Big 4, thus allowing them to resign from less well aligned 
clients without the negative financial impact. 
difficult economic times, a dropped client (and the associated revenue) 
is more difficult to replace during a downturn. Therefore we state our 
first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1. Auditors are less likely to resign following an adverse ICFR opinion 
when the economy is weak. 
 
 
2.4. Impact of economy on auditor fees 
 
An alternative way audit firms can mitigate risk is to increase the 
audit fees associated with risky clients. Generally, the presence of ICDs 
is associated with an increase in audit fees (Canada et al., 2009; Hogan 
& Wilkins, 2008; Hoitash et al., 2008; Raghunandan & Rama, 2006). 
Such fee premiums continue to exist in the years following an adverse 
ICFR opinion, regardless of whether the deficiency is remediated, indi- 
cating that the fee premium is not related simply to workload, but in- 
stead to auditors continuing to associate higher risk with these clients 
(Munsif et al., 2011). 
As is the case for all business entities attempting to endure economic 
hardship, audit firms are forced to consider their own need for income 
when considering risky clients and audit fees. During difficult economic 
times, firms are faced with significantly more pressure from clients to 
decrease audit fees (Ettredge et al., 2014). Further, prior research finds 
that increased audit fees can lead to auditor dismissals (Ettredge et al., 
2007). Audit firms may not be in an economic position to afford the 
loss of revenues associated with dismissals and may therefore choose 
to limit or even eliminate any fee increase assessed to clients with 
ICDs in an effort to retain the current and future income from those 
clients. 
We contend that audit firms will continue to charge a risk premium 
to clients with adverse ICFR opinions, as prior literature suggests. How- 
ever, we believe the magnitude of the premium will be lower when the 
economy is weak, in the interest of retaining clients. Therefore, we 
hypothesize the following: 
H2. Risk premiums assessed on adverse ICFR opinions are lower when 
the economy is weak. 
 
2.5. Subsequent auditor fees 
 
Regardless of the change in the relationship between adverse ICFR 
opinions and auditor resignations during times of economic difficulty, 
accounting firms are still likely to resign from those clients with adverse 
ICFR opinions that represent the highest level of risk. It is therefore likely 
that a firm taking on such a client in a recessionary period is in the most 
need of building and retaining a client base. Because these clients are 
arguably the most risky and the recent economic downturn is particu- 
larly acute, we are interested in assessing the degree to which the influ- 
ence of economic pressures may or may not exceed the pressure to price 
risk appropriately. In the case where risk pricing is dominated by eco- 
nomic influences, the risk premium assessed on internal control weak- 
nesses during a poor economy will be comparatively lower, so much so 
that the economic influences in a post-resignation situation may, in fact, 
dominate. Alternatively, when considering the level of risk represented 
by those clients with adverse ICFR opinions whose auditors resigned, 
the need for appropriate risk pricing may dominate economic influ- 
ences. Therefore we pose the following research question: 
RQ1. Will the premium assessed by incoming audit firms following a 
resignation after an adverse ICFR opinion be impacted by the economy? 
 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
The models used to test our hypotheses are based on prior research, 
including models used by Ettredge et al. (2011) to test auditor dismissals, 
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Table 1 
Sample details. 
 
 Records Registrants 
ICFR opinions from November 15, 2004 to January 5, 2012 30,403 5894 
Missing ICFR or financial data (2121) (348) 
Sample in study 28,282 5546 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Leading index for the United States from November 2004–January 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) to test litigation risk factor differences 
between resignations and dismissals, Lee et al. (2004) to compare 
board of director characteristic differences of firms with resignations 
versus dismissals,5 and Huang and Scholz (2012) to test the association 
between restatements and resignations. Appendix A lists and defines 
client and auditor engagement factors identified by prior studies as vari- 
ables that affect auditor changes and audit fees. We include these factors 
as control variables in our models. 
We use the following logistic regression model to test H1 that audi- 
tors are less likely to resign following an adverse ICFR opinion when the 
economy is weak: 
 
RES ¼ β0 þ β1 ICWEAK þ β2 ECON þ β3 ECON * ICWEAK þ β4 AS5 
þ β5 CSIZE þ β6 BKMK þ β7 LEV þ β8 ROA þ β9 LOSS þ β10 SPEC 
defined in Appendix A, are control variables shown to influence auditor 
changes in prior research. The model is applied to the entire population 
of ICFR reports, with a total n of 28,282. 
To test H2, that risk premiums following adverse ICFR opinions 
decrease when the economy is weak, and to provide insight into our 
research question (RQ1) regarding the influence of the economy on 
the risk premiums assessed by incoming auditors following resignations 
post adverse ICFR opinions, we use the following specification: 
 
 
lnðFEEÞ ¼ β0 þ β1ICWEAK þ β2 NUMWK þ β3ECON þ β4ECON * ICWEAK 
þ β5RES þ β6ECON * RES þ β7RES * ICWEAK 
þ β8ECON * ICWEAK * RES þ β9AS5 þ β10ASSET 
þ β11SALE=ASSET þ β12LEV þ β13ROA þ β14LOSS þ β15DELAY 
þ β16AREC þ β17 INV þ β18SPEC þ β19RESTATE þ β20LSEG 2
 
þ β21RESTRUCT þ β22GOCN þ β23BKMK þ β24BIG4 þ ε: 
ð Þ 
 
Consistent with Ettredge et al. (2011), we define the dependent 
variable, ln(FEE), as the natural log of audit fees for the year follow- 
ing the adverse ICFR opinion. The variables ICWEAK, ECON, and 
ECON*ICWEAK are consistent with those used in Eq. (1). Support for H2 
is found when the coefficient on the interaction term ECON*ICWEAK is 
significant and positive. We also include an indicator for auditor resigna- 
þ β11 CEO þ β12 GOCN þ β13 ABFEE þ β14 BIG4 þ β15 RESTATE 
þ β16 DISAGREE þ β17 REPORTABLE þ β18 AINDEP þ β19 INDEP 
þ β20 ABRETAN þ ε: 
ð1Þ 
tions (RES) and additional interactions, including a three-way interaction 
of ECON*ICWEAK*RES. We examine the coefficient on the three-way 
interaction to provide insight into our research question. A significant 
coefficient on the three-way interaction term indicates that the econo- 
The dependent variable, RES, is coded 1 if there is an auditor resigna- 
tion during the fiscal year and is 0 otherwise; indicating that there was 
either no change in auditor or that the auditor change was the result of a 
dismissal. The independent variable, ICWEAK, is coded 1 if the incum- 
bent auditor issues an adverse ICFR report and 0 otherwise. Our tests  
of the association between economic activity and auditor behavior 
require a relatively responsive, but non-volatile measure of near-term, 
forward-looking economic activity. The Leading Index for the United 
States provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia utilizes 
multiple economic inputs (e.g., housing permits, unemployment claims, 
manufacturing, and interest rates) to provide one composite index to 
capture economic trends. The combination of these metrics into a single 
index has a smoothing effect that avoids much of the volatility reflected 
in individual components, therefore providing us with a reliable, all- 
encompassing measure of the economic environment.6 A higher index 
value reflects a healthier economic outlook. We use the Leading Index 
for the United States provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel- 
phia as a measure of broad economic conditions and label this metric 
ECON. Fig. 1 presents a graph of the Leading Index over our sample 
period. Support for H1 is found when the coefficient on the interaction 
term ECON*ICWEAK is significant and positive. The remaining variables, 
 
 
 
5 Prior research assesses the independence of corporate leadership in two ways: (1) in- 
dependence of the board of directors, and (2) independence of the audit committee. We 
include audit committee independence in our specification as it most appropriately relates 
to our characteristic of interest; auditor resignations. 
my is a factor in the risk premiums assessed by incoming auditors 
following resignations in the presence of an adverse ICFR opinion. The 
remaining model variables, previously defined in Appendix A, are con- 
trol variables for other company characteristics identified by prior 
research as influencing audit fees. The model is applied to the entire 
population of ICFR reports, with a total n of 28,282. 
 
4. Results and analysis 
 
4.1. Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents details of our sample obtained from Audit Analytics. 
We extracted 30,403 records, representing 5894 distinct registrants 
with an ICFR report from November 15, 2004 to January 5, 2012. From 
this, we lost 2121 records representing 348 distinct registrants that 
were missing either ICFR data or information from Compustat needed 
to calculate control variables. Our final sample results in 28,282 records 
with ICFR reports representing 5546 distinct registrants. We also 
obtained a file from Audit Analytics containing all auditor changes. 
This file was merged with our final sample of ICFR reports, resulting in 
1443 records of companies that changed auditors within one calendar 
year of the issuance of an ICFR report, of which 295 were indicated as 
resignations. We utilize our entire sample of 28,282 ICFR opinions to 
test H1, H2, and our research question. Table 2 presents descriptive sta- 
tistics for our sample variables for the full sample, the resignation sam- 
ple, and the non-resignation sample.7 
6   The Philadelphia Reserve Bank makes the Leading Index for the United States freely    
available via the FRED database provided by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. 7  All scale variables are winsorized at the 1% level to address outliers. 
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Table 2 
 
Sample descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Full Sample (n = 28,282) Resignation (n = 295) No resignation (n = 27,987) 
 
 Min Mean Max SD  Min Mean Max SD  Min Mean Max SD  
ABFEE (2.7506) 0.0019 1.7726 0.7072  (2.7506) (0.0716) 1.7736 0.8214  (2.7506) 0.0027 1.7726 0.7059  
ABRETAN 0.0000 0.0010 0.1657 0.0024  0.0000 0.0011 0.0272 0.0028  0.0000 0.0010 0.1657 0.0024  AINDEP 0.0000 0.9752 1.0000 0.1556  0.0000 0.9356 1.0000 0.2459  0.0000 0.9756 1.0000 0.1543  AREC1 (4.6502) 4.6329 12.5633 2.7788  (4.6502) 3.4562 10.0272 2.9051  (4.6502) 4.6453 12.5633 2.7748  
AS5 0.0000 0.6246 1.0000 0.4842  0.0000 0.4644 1.0000 0.4996  0.0000 0.6263 1.0000 0.4838  ASSET1 1.9626 7.0322 13.4392 1.9752  1.9626 5.7133 12.1306 1.7827  1.9626 7.0461 13.4392 1.9724  
BIG4 0.0000 0.8060 1.0000 0.3954  0.0000 0.4644 1.0000 0.4996  0.0000 0.8096 1.0000 0.3926  BKMK (6.1479) 0.3717 7.2074 0.9646  (6.1479) 0.5281 7.2074 1.0252  (6.1479) 0.3701 7.2074 0.9638  CEO 0.0000 0.0343 1.0000 0.1819  0.0000 0.0101 1.0000 0.1005  0.0000 0.0345 1.0000 0.1826  CSIZE1 0.0000 19.7427 25.4394 3.4302  0.0000 17.8328 25.2360 3.8265  0.0000 19.7629 25.4394 3.4202  
DELAY 28.0000 70.2383 325.0000 31.7445  28.0000 94.9966 325.0000 59.1831  28.0000 69.9774 325.0000 31.2251  DISAGREE 0.0000 0.0002 1.0000 0.0133  0.0000 0.0034 1.0000 0.0582  0.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0120  ECON (2.9672) (1.0260) 0.2900 1.2964  (2.9672) (0.8265) 0.2900 1.3103  (2.9672) (1.0282) 0.2900 1.2959  GOCN 0.0000 0.0234 1.0000 0.1513  0.0000 0.0983 1.0000 0.2982  0.0000 0.0227 1.0000 0.1488  ICWEAK 0.0000 0.0843 1.0000 0.2778  0.0000 0.4610 1.0000 0.4993  0.0000 0.0803 1.0000 0.2718  INDEP 0.0000 0.9375 0.9999 0.2209  0.0000 0.8417 1.0000 0.3155  0.0000 0.9385 1.0000 0.2195  INV1 (4.6502) 1.6314 9.9200 4.3248  (4.6502) 0.4830 8.5071 3.7420  (4.6502) 1.6435 9.9200 4.3290  
LEV 0.0284 0.5661 1.7849 0.2908  0.0284 0.5741 1.7849 0.3673  0.0284 0.5660 1.7849 0.2899  LOSS 0.0000 0.2755 1.0000 0.4468  0.0000 0.4542 1.0000 0.4987  0.0000 0.2737 1.0000 0.4458  LSEG 1.0000 1.9638 36.0000 3.9553  1.0000 1.7288 30.0000 3.7016  1.0000 1.9663 36.0000 3.9579  NUMWK 0.0000 0.1999 20.0000 0.9647  0.0000 1.4949 11.0000 2.3033  0.0000 0.1863 20.0000 0.9311  REPORTABLE 0.0000 0.0175 1.0000 0.1311  0.0000 0.4610 1.0000 0.4993  0.0000 0.0128 1.0000 0.1125  RESTATE 0.0000 0.1109 1.0000 0.3140  0.0000 0.1559 1.0000 0.3634  0.0000 0.1104 1.0000 0.3134  RESTRUCT 0.0000 0.2683 1.0000 0.4431  0.0000 0.1898 1.0000 0.3928  0.0000 0.2692 1.0000 0.4435  ROA (1.3860) (0.0078) 0.5245 0.2007  (1.3860) (0.0711) 0.5245 0.3070  (1.3860) (0.0071) 0.5245 0.1991  SALE/ASSET 0.0000 0.7877 4.3421 0.7411  0.0000 0.6914 4.3421 0.7323  0.0000 0.7887 4.3421 0.7411  SPEC 0.0000 0.1324 1.0000 0.3389  0.0000 0.2644 1.0000 0.4418  0.0000 0.1310 1.0000 0.3374  
1   These variables are computed as natural logs. 
 
 
In Table 3 we present Pearson correlations for all variables. An 
analysis of the correlations provided in Table 3 reveal significant associ- 
ations between resignations (RES) and most variables included in our 
study. Most importantly for our study, RES is positively associated 
with ECON and ICWEAK. The reported correlations are consistent 
with prior work. A summary of reported internal control weaknesses 
(ICWEAK) and the number of weaknesses reported (NUMWK) per sam- 
ple year is presented in Table 4.8 
In an untabulated preliminary analysis, we validate our data set in 
terms of prior literature. Our validation consists of replicating the key 
findings in two empirical studies, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and 
Elder et al. (2009) upon which our study relies. In both cases we employ 
the same model and methodological approach as the published works. 
Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), we find a positive associ- 
ation between changes in auditor (resignation or dismissal) and an 
adverse ICFR opinion for our sample firms. Consistent with Elder et al. 
(2009), we find that, in our sample, adverse ICFR opinions increase 
the likelihood of resignations. We demonstrate comparability and con- 
sistency with prior work, and therefore proceed with our analyses. 
 
4.2. Test of hypothesis 1 
 
To test H1, we examine the impact of the economy on the frequency 
of resignations following an adverse ICFR opinion. Table 5 presents the 
results from the logistical regression used to test H1. We report results 
find that adverse ICFR reports, as measured by the ICWEAK variable, 
are a significant predictor for auditor resignations (p = 0.014). The eco- 
nomic environment variable (ECON)10  is significant and negative 
(p b 0.001), indicating that, in general, the more favorable the economy, 
the less likely the auditor is to resign from an engagement.11 The inter- 
action variable between adverse ICFR reports and economic outlook 
(ECON*ICWEAK) is significant (p = 0.003) and positive. The positive co- 
efficient on the interaction term indicates that an audit firm has an in- 
cremental increase (decrease) in the tendency to resign in response to 
an adverse ICFR report when economic outlook is more favorable (unfa- 
vorable). That is, an auditor is less likely to resign from an audit engage- 
ment where an adverse ICFR opinion is issued when the economy is 
weak as compared to when it is strong. Thus, we find support for our 
first hypothesis. 
The significant negative coefficient on the AS5 control variable (p = 
0.053) indicates, not surprisingly, that auditors are less likely to resign 
when performing the ICFR audit under the more simplified Audit Stan- 
dard 5 guidance than when performing the audit under the guidance of 
the now superseded Audit Standard 2. Consistent with prior research 
(i.e., Carcello & Neal, 2003; Johnson & Lys, 1990), we also find that larger 
companies are less likely to experience an auditor resignation (CSIZE, 
p = 0.059).12 Companies that utilize Big 4 auditors (BIG4, p = 0.001) 
are less likely to experience an auditor resignation, consistent with 
Johnson and Lys (1990) results. Auditors are more likely to resign 
for a two-way, cluster-robust standard error estimation of Eq. (1).9    10  In untabulated results we replicate our entire analysis using an alternative proxy for 
Our model is significant (p b 0.001) with a Chi-Square of 1007.63. We 
 
 
8 Our dataset encompasses registrants with an ICFR report from November 15, 2004 to 
January 5, 2012. The vast majority of audit reports for the 2011 year arrived subsequent to 
January 5, 2012. As a result, the number of observations for the 2011 sample year 
(n = 545) is smaller than for the other years. 
9   The two-way, cluster-robust standard error estimation procedure is presented 
by Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2010). This estimation procedures controls for 
heteroskedasticity in variance simultaneously for two vectors. We control for auditor 
and reporting year. 
 
economic activity. We use industrial production, manufacturing inventory and gross do- 
mestic product in a factor analysis to create our own economic index metric. The results 
obtained with the alternative economic metric are qualitatively identical to those 
reported. 
11  We do not hypothesize or expect economic factors to impact overall resignations, and 
therefore leave future research to further explore the observed negative relationship be- 
tween economy and resignations. 
12 In untabulated results we also estimate our model using the log of total assets as a size 
control. The results are qualitatively identical yielding the same conclusion we formally 
present in Table 5. 
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Table 3 
Pearson correlations. 
 
 ABFEE ABRETAN AINDEP AREC ASSET AS5 BIG4 BKMK CEO DELAY DISAGREE 
ABFEE 1.0000           
ABRETAN (0.0149)⁎ 1.0000          
AINDEP (0.0187)⁎⁎ 0.1001⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000         
AREC 0.0202⁎⁎⁎ (0.1060)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0391⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000        
ASSET (0.0025) (0.0980)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0552⁎⁎⁎ 0.8010⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000       
AS5 (0.0093) 0.3196⁎⁎⁎ (0.1227)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0103⁎ 0.0459⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000      
BIG4 (0.0030) (0.0304)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0510⁎⁎⁎ 0.1605⁎⁎⁎ 0.3169⁎⁎⁎ (0.0343)⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000     
BKMK (0.1186)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0833⁎⁎⁎ (0.0075) 0.0449⁎⁎⁎ 0.0372⁎⁎⁎ 0.0749⁎⁎⁎ (0.0779)⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000    
CEO 0.0193⁎⁎ (0.0052) 0.0101⁎ 0.0664⁎⁎⁎ 0.0851⁎⁎⁎ 0.0007 0.0629⁎⁎⁎ (0.0159)⁎⁎ 1.0000   
DELAY 0.0091 0.0250⁎⁎⁎ (0.0177)⁎⁎ (0.0716)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0837)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0174)⁎⁎ (0.0402)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0305⁎⁎⁎ (0.0354)⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000  
DISAGREE 0.0003 (0.0055) 0.0021 (0.0083) (0.0115)⁎ (0.0172)⁎⁎ (0.0069) (0.0010) (0.0025) 0.0254⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000 
ECON 0.0108⁎ (0.2687)⁎⁎⁎ 0.2310⁎⁎⁎ (0.0106)⁎ (0.0434)⁎⁎⁎ (0.6232)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0219⁎⁎⁎ (0.0667)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0019) 0.0182⁎⁎ 0.0126⁎ 
GOCN (0.0024) 0.0711⁎⁎⁎ (0.0864)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1575)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1467)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0381⁎⁎⁎ (0.0670)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0444)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0112)⁎ 0.0928⁎⁎⁎ (0.0021) 
ICWEAK 0.0004 (0.0098)⁎ 0.0051 (0.0808)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1144)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1349)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0871)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0262)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0030 0.3073⁎⁎⁎ 0.0438⁎⁎⁎ 
INDEP 0.0012 0.0847⁎⁎⁎ (0.0161)⁎⁎ 0.0385⁎⁎⁎ 0.0508⁎⁎⁎ (0.0399)⁎⁎⁎ 0.1599⁎⁎⁎ 0.0149⁎ 0.0202⁎⁎⁎ (0.0805)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0004) 
INV 0.0946⁎⁎⁎ (0.0323)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0283⁎⁎⁎ 0.3840⁎⁎⁎ 0.3862⁎⁎⁎ 0.0476⁎⁎⁎ 0.1596⁎⁎⁎ 0.0163⁎⁎ 0.0620⁎⁎⁎ (0.0294)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0004 
LEV (0.0621)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0329⁎⁎⁎ (0.0266)⁎⁎⁎ 0.3781⁎⁎⁎ 0.3513⁎⁎⁎ 0.0070 (0.0116)⁎ (0.1469)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0117⁎ (0.0114)⁎ 0.0033 
LOSS 0.0008 0.2652⁎⁎⁎ (0.0857)⁎⁎⁎ (0.3138)⁎⁎⁎ (0.2959)⁎⁎⁎ 0.1050⁎⁎⁎ (0.0805)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0136)⁎ (0.0100)⁎ 0.1144⁎⁎⁎ 0.0037 
LSEG (0.0009) 0.0215⁎⁎⁎ 0.0043 0.1399⁎⁎⁎ 0.1915⁎⁎⁎ 0.1058⁎⁎⁎ 0.0952⁎⁎⁎ (0.0174)⁎⁎ 0.0270⁎⁎⁎ (0.0097) (0.0035) 
NUMWK 0.0009 (0.0249)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0055 (0.0538)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0788)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1055)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0606)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0281)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0005 0.3849⁎⁎⁎ 0.0221⁎⁎⁎ 
REPORTABLE 0.0244⁎⁎⁎ 0.0071 0.0074 (0.0353)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0611)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0564)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0191)⁎⁎ 0.0045 0.0015 0.1198⁎⁎⁎ 0.0388⁎⁎⁎ 
RES (0.0107)⁎ 0.0038 (0.0261)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0435)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0686)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0340)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0887)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0166⁎⁎ (0.0136)⁎ 0.0801⁎⁎⁎ 0.0248⁎⁎⁎ 
RESTATE (0.0005) (0.0064) 0.0202⁎⁎⁎ (0.0134)⁎ (0.0327)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1041)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0095) (0.0053) 0.0009 0.0014 0.0122⁎ 
RESTRUCT 0.0004 0.0198⁎⁎⁎ (0.0090) 0.1215⁎⁎⁎ 0.1151⁎⁎⁎ 0.0464⁎⁎⁎ 0.1555⁎⁎⁎ (0.1233)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0768⁎⁎⁎ (0.0386)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0021) 
ROA (0.0100)⁎ (0.0394)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0194⁎⁎ 0.0319⁎⁎⁎ 0.0253⁎⁎⁎ (0.0021) 0.0224⁎⁎⁎ 0.0507⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002 (0.0122)⁎ (0.0016) 
SALE/ASSET 0.1134⁎⁎⁎ (0.0171)⁎⁎ (0.0091) (0.0572)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1653)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0073) 0.1097⁎⁎⁎ (0.0913)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0475⁎⁎⁎ (0.0441)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0074 
SPEC 0.0005 (0.0087) (0.0208)⁎⁎⁎ 0.1033⁎⁎⁎ 0.0029 (0.0115)⁎ (0.4114)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0948⁎⁎⁎ (0.0346)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0114⁎ 0.0105⁎ 
 
 ECON GOCN ICWEAK INDEP INV LEV LOSS LSEG NUMWK REPORTABLE 
ECON 
GOCN 
1.0000 
(0.0287)⁎⁎⁎ 
 
1.0000 
        
ICWEAK 
INDEP 
0.1056⁎⁎⁎ 
(0.0009) 
0.1019⁎⁎⁎ 
(0.0862)⁎⁎⁎ 
1.0000 
(0.0611)⁎⁎⁎ 
 
1.0000 
      
INV (0.0294)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0509)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0205)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0205⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000      
LEV (0.0171)⁎⁎ 0.1537⁎⁎⁎ 0.0125⁎ (0.0373)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0559⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000     
LOSS (0.0818)⁎⁎⁎ 0.2214⁎⁎⁎ 0.1288⁎⁎⁎ (0.0658)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1330)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0527⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000    
LSEG (0.0795)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0171)⁎⁎ (0.0243)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0132⁎ 0.1027⁎⁎⁎ 0.0384⁎⁎⁎ (0.0292)⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000   
NUMWK 0.0843⁎⁎⁎ 0.1135⁎⁎⁎ 0.6830⁎⁎⁎ (0.0846)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0077) 0.0318⁎⁎⁎ 0.1164⁎⁎⁎ (0.0093) 1.0000  
REPORTABLE 0.0470⁎⁎⁎ 0.0488⁎⁎⁎ 0.2662⁎⁎⁎ (0.0185)⁎⁎ (0.0099)⁎ (0.0014) 0.0649⁎⁎⁎ (0.0180)⁎⁎ 0.2258⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000 
RES 0.0158⁎⁎ 0.0508⁎⁎⁎ 0.1392⁎⁎⁎ (0.0406)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0273)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0028 0.0411⁎⁎⁎ (0.0069) 0.1378⁎⁎⁎ 0.3472⁎⁎⁎ 
RESTATE 0.0779⁎⁎⁎ (0.0086) 0.0736⁎⁎⁎ 0.0131⁎ (0.0257)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0094 0.0007 (0.0238)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0533⁎⁎⁎ 0.0293⁎⁎⁎ 
RESTRUCT (0.0187)⁎⁎ 0.0148⁎ 0.0251⁎⁎⁎ 0.0206⁎⁎⁎ 0.1855⁎⁎⁎ 0.0468⁎⁎⁎ 0.1145⁎⁎⁎ 0.0746⁎⁎⁎ 0.0184⁎⁎ 0.0062 
ROA 0.0063 (0.0687)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0221)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0175⁎⁎ 0.0119⁎ (0.0486)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0973)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0051 (0.0242)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0080) 
SALE/ASSET (0.0023) (0.0291)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0141⁎ 0.0299⁎⁎⁎ 0.2670⁎⁎⁎ (0.1112)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0983)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0210⁎⁎⁎ 0.0185⁎⁎ 0.0085 
SPEC 0.0104⁎ 0.0057 (0.0992)⁎⁎⁎ (0.1258)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0992)⁎⁎⁎ 0.1538⁎⁎⁎ 0.0028 (0.0505)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0121⁎ 0.0020 
  RES  RESTATE  RESTRUCT  ROA  SALE/ASSET 
RES 
RESTATE 
 1.0000 
0.0147⁎ 
  
1.0000 
      
RESTRUCT  (0.0182)⁎⁎  (0.0050)  1.0000     
ROA  (0.0064)  (0.0061)  (0.0178)⁎⁎ 1.0000 
SALE/AT  (0.0133)⁎  0.0049  0.1415⁎⁎⁎ 0.0787⁎⁎⁎ 1.0000 
SPEC  0.0400⁎⁎⁎  (0.0001)  (0.1163)⁎⁎⁎ (0.0080) (0.2034)⁎⁎⁎ 
⁎  p b 0.100.        
⁎⁎  p b 0.010.        
⁎⁎⁎  p b 0.001.        
 
when there is a reportable condition (REPORTABLE, p b 0.001), less likely 
to resign when the audit committee is independent (AINDEP, p b 0.001), 
and less likely to resign when there is an abnormal fee (ABFEE, p = 
0.027) (Ettredge et al., 2007, 2011; Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997; Lee 
et al., 2004). Consistent with Krishnan and Krishnan (1997), increased 
auditor independence (INDEP, p = 0.059) is negatively associated 
with auditor resignations.13 
 
 
13 We also test for the presence of an industry specific fixed-effect using a two-digit SIC 
classification. A total of 2879 observations represented by 29 two-digit SIC groups are 
4.3. Test of hypothesis 2 
 
To test H2, we examine the effect of economic outlook on subse- 
quent audit fees when an adverse ICFR report is issued. We predict 
that risk premiums on audit fees following adverse ICFR opinions will 
decrease when the economy is weak. Table 6 presents the results for 
H2 which is also estimated with a two-way, cluster-robust standard 
error estimation approach.14 Our model is significant (p b 0.001) with 
an F-statistic of 2315.56. The regression results presented in Table 6 
show a positive (p b 0.001) coefficient on ICWEAK, which suggests 
dropped due to a lack of variability in the outcome variable (RES). The results based on    
the remaining 25,389 observations represented by 41 two-digit SIC groups yield conclu- 
sions identical to those formally presented. 
14  The SAS macro is available at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/~dtayl/SAS2waycluster. 
sas. 
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Table 4 
 
Summary of frequency and number of internal control weaknesses. 
 
Year Obs Observations with internal control 
weaknesses (ICWEAK = 1) 
Percent of observations with internal 
control weaknesses (ICWEAK = 1) 
Total number of internal control 
weaknesses (NUMWK) 
Average number 
of internal control weaknesses for 
firms where ICWEAK = 1 
2004 2651 472 0.18 1233 2.61 
2005 3843 519 0.14 1301 2.51 
2006 4122 417 0.10 983 2.36 
2007 4274 355 0.08 792 2.23 
2008 4497 257 0.06 537 2.09 
2009 4243 185 0.04 444 2.40 
2010 4107 158 0.04 320 2.02 
2011 5451 21 0.04 45 2.14 
Total 28,282 2384 0.08 5655 2.37 
1   Our dataset encompasses registrants with an ICFR report from November 15, 2004 to January 5, 2012. The smaller number of observations in 2011 reflects that the vast majority of 
audit reports for the 2011 year arrived subsequent to January 5, 2012. 
 
that fees assessed by auditors are higher when internal control weak- 
nesses are present. The non-significant coefficient (p = 0.136) on 
ECON suggests that, in general, assessed fees are not adjusted in refer- 
ence to economic outlook. The positive and significant interaction 
term (ECON*ICWEAK, p = 0.002) between adverse ICFR reports and eco- 
nomic outlook indicates that the penalty (i.e., higher fees) is higher for 
internal control weaknesses when the economy is stronger, therefore 
indicating that the fee penalty is lower when the economic outlook is 
less favorable. While the auditor continues to charge a risk premium 
when an adverse ICFR opinion is issued, they charge a lower risk premi- 
um during times of economic difficulty. Thus, we find support for our 
second hypothesis. 
Consistent with prior literature, we find that larger companies 
(ASSET, p b 0.001; SALE/ASSET, p = 0.072; AREC, p = 0.003; INV, 
 
 
Table 5 
Auditor resignations following adverse ICFR opinion in an economic downturn.⁎ 
 
RES ¼ β0 þ β1 ICWEAK þ β2 ECON þ β3 ECON * ICWEAK þ β4 AS5 þ β5 CSIZE þ β6 BKMK 
þ β7 LEV þ β8 ROA þ β9 LOSS þ β10 SPEC þ β11 CEO þ β12 GOCN þ β13 ABFEE 
þ β14 BIG4 þ β15 RESTATE þ β16 DISAGREE þ β17 REPORTABLE þ β18 AINDEP 
p b 0.001; LSEG, p b 0.001) have higher audit fees (Carcello & Neal, 
2003; Ettredge et al., 2011; Johnson & Lys, 1990). We also find that 
more leverage and higher return on assets (LEV, p  b 0.000; ROA, 
p b 0.001) are associated with lower audit fees, while losses (LOSS, 
p b 0.001) are associated with higher fees (Johnstone & Bedard, 2004; 
Krishnan, 1994). Financial statement restatements, restructuring, and 
going concern opinions (RESTATE, p b 0.001; RESTRUCT, p b 0.001; 
GOCN, p b 0.001) are also associated with higher fees (Huang & Scholz, 
2012; Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997). Lastly, we find that specialist audi- 
tors (SPEC, p b 0.001) charge a lower fee (Carcello & Neal, 2003; 
Ettredge et al., 2011) but Big 4 auditors (BIG4, p b 0.001) charge a higher 
fee in general. 
 
Table 6 
Association between internal control weakness and audit fees in economic downturn.⁎. 
 
lnðFEEÞ ¼ β0 þ β1 ICWEAK  þ β2 NUMWK  þ β3 ECON  þ β4 ECON * ICWEAK þ β5 RES 
þ β6 ECON * RES þ β7 RES * ICWEAK þ β8 ECON * ICWEAK * RES þ β9 AS5 
þ β10 ASSET þ β11 SALE=ASSET þ β12 LEV þ β13 ROA þ β14 LOSS þ β15 DELAY 
þ β16 AREC þ β17 INV þ β18 SPEC þ β19 RESTATE þ β20 LSEG þ β21 RESTRUCT 
þ β22 GOCN þ β23 BKMK þ β24 BIG4 þ ε 
 
þ β19 INDEP þ β20 ABRETAN þ ε: Variables Exp. sign Coefficient p-Values 
Intercept +/− 10.3895 0.000 
ICWEAK + 0.2061 0.000 
NUMWK + 0.0902 0.000 
ECON + (0.0039) 0.136 
ECON*ICWEAK + 0.0613 0.002 
RES + 0.0370 0.683 
ECON*RES + 0.1152 0.028 
RES*ICWEAK +/− (0.0614) 0.545 
ECON*ICWEAK⁎ +/− (0.0381) 0.680 
LEV + 0.0108 0.923 RES    ROA − (0.0722) 0.824 AS5 − 0.0004 0.988 
LOSS + 0.1014 0.576 ASSET + 0.4409 0.000 
SPEC +/− 0.2357 0.386 SALE/ASSET + 0.0823 0.072 
CEO + (0.6844) 0.179 LEV − (0.5097) 0.000 
GOCN + 0.4969 0.135 ROA − (0.3499) 0.000 
ABFEE − (0.2293) 0.027 LOSS + 0.0913 0.000 
BIG4 − (1.4751) 0.001 DELAY + 0.0002 0.503 
RESTATE + 0.0649 0.780 AREC + 0.0000 0.003 
DISAGREE + 0.0761 0.937 INV + 0.0000 0.000 
REPORTABLE + 3.8687 0.000 SPEC − (0.2428) 0.000 
AINDEP − (1.1859) 0.000 RESTATE + 0.0962 0.000 
INDEP + (0.1727) 0.059 LSEG + 0.1022 0.000 
ABRETAN + 0.2376 0.516 RESTRUCT + 0.5259 0.000 
    GOCN + 0.2042 0.000 Auditor Resignation =   295 BKMK + (0.1099) 0.000 Auditor Dismissal =   1149 BIG4 + 0.6098 0.000 
 
Total n = 28,282 
Model F-statistic = 2315.56 
Model Significance = 0.000 
R2 = 0.7330 
No change =   26,838 Total n =   28,282 Model Chi-Square =   1007.63 
Model Significance =   0.000 Pseudo R2 =   0.3073 
* We report two-way, cluster-robust standard errors clustered on audit firm and 
reporting year. 
* We report two-way, cluster-robust standard errors clustered on audit firm and 
reporting year. 
Variables Exp. sign Coefficient p-Values 
Intercept +/− (2.0189) 0.012 
ICWEAK + 0.8741 0.014 
ECON +/− (0.1690) 0.000 
ECON*ICWEAK − 0.3410 0.003 
AS5 − (0.6616) 0.053 
CSIZE − (0.0508) 0.059 
BKMK +/− 0.0002 0.516 
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4.4. Research question 
 
Table 6 also presents the results of a three-way interaction that 
provides insight into our research question, which examines the impact 
of the economic outlook on subsequent auditor fees for clients with 
adverse ICFR opinions who have experienced an auditor resignation 
(ECON*ICWEAK*RES). The non-significant coefficient on RES (p = 
0.683) indicates that resignations in general do not affect subsequent 
auditor fees. However, the interaction of ECON*RES is significant and 
positive (p = 0.028) indicating that a resignation coupled with a 
strong (weak) economy will result in the subsequent auditor charg- 
ing higher (lower) incremental fees. 
Our results also indicate that, in general, a resignation following 
an adverse ICFR opinion does not impact subsequent auditor fees, 
as the coefficient on RES*ICWEAK is not significant (p = 0.545). Fur- 
ther, the three-way interaction of interest in our research question 
(ECON*ICWEAK*RES) is also not significant (p = 0.680), thereby pro- 
viding no evidence that the economy will impact the fees subsequent 
auditors charge following a resignation in the presence of an adverse 
ICFR opinion. Given the higher need for income during a weak econ- 
omy, those clients who receive adverse ICFR opinions and experience 
an auditor resignation likely represent the riskiest clients for audit 
firms. Our lack of significant findings indicates that subsequent auditors 
are not impacted by the economy when determining how to price the 
risk associated with such clients. Thus, it appears that for the riskiest 
of clients, economic factors do not exceed the need for auditors to 
appropriately price risk. 
 
5. Summary and discussion 
 
Our study examines the impact of the economy on auditor risk man- 
agement strategies, as measured by auditor resignations and fees 
following adverse ICFR opinions. Our analyses indicate that the econom- 
ic environment influences both auditor resignations and fee increases 
following adverse ICFR opinions. We find that when the economy is 
weak, auditors are less likely to resign from clients with adverse ICFR 
opinions than when the economy is strong. Further, for those clients 
with adverse ICFR opinions from whom the auditor does not resign, 
the fee premium often used to manage risk is lower during times of eco- 
nomic difficulty than otherwise. These results suggest that economic 
factors influence auditors' propensity to accept and price risk appropri- 
ately. However, for the riskiest of clients, clients with adverse ICFR opin- 
ions from which auditors resign, we do not find evidence indicating that 
the successor auditor is influenced by economic factors when making 
pricing decisions. Our results indicate that, while economic factors im- 
pact risk tolerance levels for audit firms overall, they do not influence 
risk pricing strategies for the most risky clients. 
Our findings provide insight into how audit firms manage risk dur- 
ing difficult economic times. Our results indicate that auditors will 
change their risk management strategies in such a way as to maximize 
income. In particular, auditors are more willing to remain with risky 
clients (i.e., firms with adverse ICFR opinions) when the economy is 
poor. Further, auditors charge a lower risk premium to those clients. 
Given that increased audit fees are positively associated with dismissals 
(Ettredge et al., 2007); this may be an effort for firms to avoid losing 
clients and therefore revenues. However, for the riskiest of clients, suc- 
cessor auditors do not allow economic factors to influence how they 
price risk. Thus, auditors are willing to change their risk profiles to retain 
the income provided by risky clients, but only up to a certain point. 
Our study extends the risk management literature by examining the 
impact of adverse ICFR audit opinions on auditors' risk management 
strategies, both resignations and fee increases, in varying economic 
environments. Our study also contributes to the growing body of litera- 
ture that examines the influence of external economic factors on the 
audit process. Further, our results provide important information to 
environment, it is especially important that when performing client 
continuance and acceptance procedures, audit firms carefully consider 
the need for revenues versus the potential increase in liability resulting 
from loosened risk management policies. 
We note the following area for future research: researchers could 
continue to investigate the impact of the economic environment on 
auditor change decisions, relating to both resignations and dismissals, 
and audit fees. Given that litigation risk remains a concern for firms, 
an improved understanding of post-SOX resignation and fee patterns 
could lead to more effective management of engagement risk by audit 
firms. 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
 
 
Variable Description 
 
 
ABFEE Calculated as the residuals from standard audit fee model,a based 
on findings that abnormal fees are associated with auditor changes 
(Ettredge et al., 2007, 2011). 
ABRETAN Cumulative abnormal return estimated via the market model for 
the client firm over the 260 trading days prior to the fiscal year end. 
AINDEP Audit committee independence, equals 1 if over half of the audit 
committee members are independent and 0 otherwise, based on 
findings that low audit committee independence is more likely to 
lead to resignation (Lee et al., 2004). 
AREC Level of receivable balances reported as of the close of the reporting 
period divided by total assets (Ettredge et al., 2011). We compute 
AREC as the natural log of receivables. 
AS5 Audit Standard 5. AS5 superseded AS2 as providing guidance for 
ICFR audits during our sample period. AS5 equals 0 in the period 
prior to AS5 implementation (2004–2006), 1 otherwise. 
ASSET Total assets based on findings indicating that larger clients are less 
likely to experience an auditor change (Carcello & Neal, 2003; 
Ettredge et al., 2011; Johnson & Lys, 1990). We compute ASSET as 
the natural log of total assets. 
BIG4 Auditor size, operationalized by classifying auditors as either Big 4 
or non-Big 4, where BIG4 equals 1 if the auditor is a Big 4, based on 
pre-SOX research that finds that an auditor change is less likely to 
occur with a Big 4 auditor (Johnson & Lys, 1990) and post-SOX 
research that finds that, at least for dismissals, a client is more likely 
to dismiss a Big 4 auditor (Ettredge et al., 2007; Ettredge et al., 2011). 
BKMK Book to market calculated as the book value of equity divided by 
the market value of equity. Lower values of BKMK indicate higher 
growth prospects. Prior research suggests that corporate growth is 
associated with auditor realignment (Ettredge et al., 2011; Johnson 
& Lys, 1990). 
CEO CEO Change, equals 1 if the client hired a new CEO during the fiscal 
year and 0 otherwise, based on findings that new CEOs are associated 
with auditor changes. 
CSIZE Client Size calculated as the natural log of client revenues, based on 
findings indicating that larger clients are less likely to experience 
and auditor change (Carcello & Neal, 2003; Ettredge et al., 2011; 
Johnson & Lys, 1990). 
DELAY Delay is the number of days between the client's fiscal year end and 
audit report date (Ettredge et al., 2011). 
DISAGREE Disagreement, equals 1 if the auditor disclosed information about 
disagreements with the client over accounting issues and 0 
otherwise, based on findings of a positive association between 
disagreements and resignations (DeFond et al., 1992; Krishnan & 
Krishnan, 1997). 
ECON ECON represents the near-term economic environment. We use the 
Leading Index for the United States provided by the Federal Reserve 
practitioners about trends in risk management. In today's litigious    
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(continued) 
 
Variable Description 
Bockus, K., & Gigler, F. (1998). A theory of auditor resignation. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 36, 191–208. 
Canada, J., Sutton, S. G., & Kuhn, J. R., Jr. (2009). The pervasive nature of IT controls: An 
examination of material weaknesses in IT controls and audit fees. International 
ECON Bank of Philadelphia for the numerical value of our ECON variable. 
The Leading Index utilizes multiple economic inputs (e.g., housing 
permits, unemployment claims, manufacturing, and interest rates) 
to provide one composite index to capture economic trends. 
Journal of Accounting and Information Management, 17, 109–119. 
Carcello, J. V., & Neal, T. L. (2003). Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals 
following  “New”  going-concern  reports.  The  Accounting  Review,  78,  95–117. 
DeFond, M. (1992). The association between changes in client firm agency costs and 
GOCN Going concern, equals 1 if the client received a going concern report 
and 0 otherwise, based on findings that going-concern reports can 
lead to auditor change. 
INDEP Auditor independence, measured as 1—(fees collected from the 
client as a percent of the total audit fees collected). INDEP is a proxy 
for the relative importance of the client in the auditor's portfolio of 
clients. Auditors are more likely to resign from clients from whom 
they are more independent financially (Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997). 
INV Inventory balances reported as of the close of the reporting period 
divided by total assets (Ettredge et al., 2011). We compute INV in 
log form. 
LEV Leverage, calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets, based 
on findings that companies with increasing leverage are more likely 
to change auditors (Johnstone & Bedard, 2004; Krishnan, 1994). 
LOSS Loss, equals 1 for clients reporting a loss and 0 otherwise. Prior 
research finds that less profitable companies are more likely to 
experience an auditor change (Johnstone & Bedard, 2004; Krishnan, 
1994). 
LSEG Log of the number of reporting segments reported by the client 
(Ettredge et al., 2011). 
NUMWK Number of material weaknesses (Ettredge et al., 2007, 2011). 
REPORTABLE  Reportable event, equals 1 if the auditor disclosed a situation where 
the client was informed that the auditor questions the accuracy or 
reliability of the clients disclosed information and 0 otherwise, based 
on findings that reportable events can lead to resignations due to 
increased litigation risk (DeFond, 1992; Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997). 
RESTATE Restatement, equals 1 if the client restated their financial 
statements in a later period and 0 otherwise, based on findings that 
resignations are more likely to occur following restatements 
(Huang & Scholz, 2012; Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997). 
RESTRUCT Takes on the value of 1 if the firm underwent a restructuring during 
the year, 0 otherwise (Ettredge et al., 2011). 
ROA Return on asset, measured as net income divided by total assets. 
Prior research finds that less profitable companies are more likely 
to experience an auditor change (Johnstone & Bedard, 2004; 
Krishnan, 1994). 
SALE/ASSET     Total Sales divided by Total Assets based on findings indicating that 
larger client are less likely to experience an auditor change 
(Carcello & Neal, 2003; Ettredge et al., 2011; Johnson & Lys, 1990). 
SPEC Specialist, equals 1 if the predecessor auditor's largest portfolio 
share is in the client's industry. Portfolio share is based on the 
sum of fees from each two-digit SIC industry code divided by the 
auditor's total audit fees (Ettredge et al., 2011). Prior work suggests 
that clients are less likely to dismiss an industry specialist auditor 
(Carcello & Neal, 2003), and more likely to change to an industry 
specialist (Ettredge et  al., 2011). 
 
 
aThe model, based on the fee model used by Ettredge (Ettredge et al., 2007, 2011), is: 
 
lnðFEEÞ ¼ b0 þ b1 LNðASSETÞ þ b2 SALE=ASSET þ b3 LEVERAGE þ b4 ROA þ b5 LOSS 
þ b6 BKMK þ b7 BIG4 þ b8 DELAY þ b9 AREC þ b10 INVENTORY þ b11 SPECIALIST 
þ b12 RESTATE þ b13 LSEG þ b14 RESTRUCT þ b15 GOCN þ b16 ICWEAK 
þ b17 NUMBERMW þ YEAR: 
 
The model uses all companies receiving internal control reports over our sample 
period. It is highly significant and variables are significant in directions consistent 
with prior studies. ln(FEE) is the natural log of audit fees; LN(ASSET) is the natural log of 
total assets; SALE/ASSET is total client revenue divided by total client assets; DELAY is the 
number of days between the client's fiscal year-end and audit report date; LSEG is the 
natural log of the number of operating segments reported by the client; YEAR is an indicator 
variable for fiscal years. Other variables are defined previously. 
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